On the other hand, some may wonder, “Why should we listen to Alek when we have street-certified “Gs” in the manosphere?” To such thinkers, I would respond, “How many of those street-certified ‘Gs’ can say that they were ‘your favourite gangster’s favourite gangster (digital)?’ That mid-to-high level criminals would boil when their gentleman-ly presence would arrive at the gentlemen-est of all places: the Gentlemen’s Club?  That they pulled up on ‘dishonourable people’ on some Equalizer (2014,2018,2023) swag?” (The answer, if it is not obvious, is none of them.)

So, here is a “Gentleman’s Origin Story” that would eventually make way for the “Gospels of a Gentleman”, a story with a hazy beginning and as non-linear as it gets.

“Are the stories about you true?” – Messenger boy (Troy, 2004)

People have conferred many nicknames upon me over the years, but the best stem from my time spent in my natural habitat – the Gentlemen’s Club, like “Mr. Martini Ya Heard” and “Denzel”. These are just a few of the many nicknames, no different from my many labels from over the years, like “high school hacker”, “university dropout”, and “international humanitarian”.

Even though the more people learn about me the more questions they begin to have, everything can be explained in the lay-est of terms. Understanding the first (Mr. Martini Ya Heard) is simple, an affinity for martinis, if a person understands New York slang (Ya Heard). The second (Denzel) can be best understood through the lens of the Equalizer film franchise, how I move fluidly in my natural habitat.

For anyone ignorant enough to ask the stupid question of, “Why ‘Denzel’ and not ‘Jerome’?” I would respond by labelling that question-asker as a ‘racist’, then explaining how I had a different physical build. But before anyone can understand the nicknames in totality, it requires retracing my footprints, before I first walked through the gates of the Gentlemen’s Club—back to my teenage hacking days.

As a child, I started out like Anakin, until I discovered the power of the computer (my version of The Force) – it was my destiny. For Anakin, that meant eventually joining the dark side. For me, that meant entering the dark web. However, the plot twist in my story is that I used my newfound powers to go after jedi (police) and sith (criminals) – without either’s knowledge (albeit the jedi found out a few years after). All of it would lead me to the realization that there were times where there was little distinction between the two (My Crazy Life – The Greatest Hacks are Seldom Told documented some of those details).

By the time I was set to graduate from high school, I knew things about the jedi and the sith that would enrage Canadians of all political stripes if they became aware of how reckless high-level police investigations could get.

As it related to the sith, I was able to discover the exact times that hard drugs were scheduled to get trafficked between provinces, and even into Ottawa. Hard drugs were also being transported by air through private airports (which had abysmal security), between British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. Hard drugs were also being transported from Quebec into Ontario, through long-distance truckers, who had legitimate truck delivery routes.

Confidential informants were abusing their relationship with the police, everything from getting out of trouble for minor violations to abusing women and minors, and on some occasions, even blackmailing officers into certain actions and outcomes. But that may be the price to pay when it comes to high level narco-related investigations, like those related to narco-trafficking, often involved with terrorism financing and more.

Practically everything that the jedi knew about the sith, I knew as well, but I managed to learn even more about the sith, collecting information beyond what the jedi knew about the international sith order. So, equipped with the most intimate details of high-level policing investigations and organized criminal transnational operations, I decided it was time to pay a visit to Canada’s most feared criminal organization, the outlaw biker group known as the Hells Angels.

The main mission becomes an afterthought when an unforeseen quest emerges

Who the hell would even consider connecting with organized criminals for the sole purpose of lecturing them about their criminal activities, and then showing up to the front door of establishments that were linked with organized criminal activities? Someone who has gained an intimate understanding of the psychosocial profiles of such organized criminals, whose tattoos are often an attempt to cover for not being comfortable in their own skin, and someone who has serious leverage over them (leverage is a MFer). So, a skinny-fat high school Alek, armed with a man purse, pulled up to Ottawa-Gatineau’s best Gentlemen’s Club, one renowned for being a playground for “Hells Angels” – without his Orthodox cross and no holy water.

From the moment I stepped out of my car, I knew who many of the bikers were, as well as their psychosocial profiles. Strutting through the gates of Ottawa-Gatineau’s best Gentlemen’s Club, it was about to go down, until that version of Alek froze like a deer. Blinded by headlights, headlights everywhere. “Crash! Bang! Whack!”. Thankfully, it only took me a few seconds to regain my wits, all thanks to the countless hours I had spent in similar clubs in GTA Vice City (2002) and GTA San Andreas (2004). Who could have imagined that the Grand Theft Auto video game franchise would end up saving the day? Not me.

What started out as the main mission, to connect with top Hells Angels’ leadership and to let them know that I knew everything about them, from their personal information to their organization’s criminal activities, became an afterthought. It was not my fault, nor did I chicken-out. Instead, blame it on all the headlights and the hypnotizing effect they had on that version of Alek. Because all my attention and desires went towards appreciating those exotic sports cars.

What ended up transpiring saw that version of Alek, armed with a man purse, become every gals’ favourite guy (even more so than their “protection boyfriends”). All the attention I began to receive also gave rise to a never-before-seen level of vitriolic jealousy – mid-to-high level criminals were incapable of paying to receive the kind of affection I was receiving. Simply put, those scumbags lacked the intellectual capacity to realize that if emulating what they were seeing in rap music videos was not working, by trying to look mean and tough and referring to gals by using explicative language, then maybe it was time to try something new.

Naturally, these criminals attempted to come around and try to start up conversations with me, by saying things like, “I see you player!”, “Whatever you on, put me on too, homie!”, “Sick bag, what’s in it, my G?”. Then there were questions like, “What kind of game you be spitting?” and “How do you holla at them to get them to be cool with you like that?”. Being the non-serious person that I was, especially when I lack respect for people, I would respond with suggestions like telling them that they needed to watch the Boss’n Up (2005), featuring Snoop Dogg.

Somehow my responses seemed to piss those criminals off. Their comments changed, from “respect” to comments like, “Look at that trick!” and “It’s Big Simpin”. Those criminals were individuals who were in their 20s and 30s emulating everything that they were seeing in rap music videos, being obsessed with looking tough and disrespecting gals by calling them explicative terms, obsessed with impressing other “Gs”. What they needed was not any advice from me, what they needed were direction to a Chippendales.

Probably the only reason I never got attacked by those criminals was because I would make specific comments about specific criminal activities that had them thinking I was a “NARC” or “undercover” (I wasn’t, I just hacked). On the other hand, some law-abiding citizens began to think that I was some sort of “Alejandro Sosa” (Scarface, 1983). But the only thing that mattered to me was what my gal pals and their female friends (aka Ottawa-Gatineau’s version of The Bad Girls Club, (2006-2017)) thought about me. And word had spread about a straight high schooler armer with a man purse who was an expert on ladies lingerie (Working as a Highschooler at Sears’ Ladies’ Lingerie Department), who would say things like how real men went to spas, and who could walk into a women’s store without it affecting his (healthy) masculinity. Truly a five-star OG (for whom the “OG” acronym stood for “original gentleman”).

Truthfully speaking, there was no secret recipe to interacting with my gal pals, I just happened to have what may possibly have been the greatest 1- to 2-minute opening monologue, one that makes the best Saturday Night Live openings look like amateur hour. It may have helped that I was fluent in a few languages: transitioning from simple English to Shakespearean English and even Spanish, capable of emulating Lil Wayne’s flow and moving like those Diplomats (the Dipset kind). Oh, and I may have bragged about “knowing” some stuff about some stuff.

Perhaps the moral of this story should be that exotic sport cars are scary because of the power of their engines. Still, spending enough time on the racetrack, one can become a Michael Schumacher or a Lewis Hamilton. Or, a Nick Lauda (1949-2019) or a Dale Earnhardt (1951-2001), for those who prefer NASCAR to Formula 1. So, Gentlemen, start your engines!

WorldStarHipHop saved my life

As it relates to driving, there may have been an instance where I had managed to intercept communications about how hard drugs were scheduled to arrive at a Hells Angels clubhouse on the outskirts of Ottawa (Carlsbad Springs). So, I hopped into my mom’s Nissan Sentra and drove to the Carlsbad Springs clubhouse, driving up and down the street that it was located on. “How many times”, you may ask? Well, enough for a few people from the Clubhouse to step outside and one of them to wave me over to talk to me. It was a brief conversation – quite funny.

Based on my snooping around, I thought it would be a good idea to go work at specific resorts in Mazatlán, Mexico. Even crazier, I literally taught myself to speak Spanish at an A2/B1 level, prioritizing it over my nursing studies, so that I could lecture the cartels about their criminal activities. Had I ended up following through and moving to Mazatlán, Mexico, there could have been the potential for a “Valentine’s Day Special – Don Juan/Rico Suave Edition”. Albeit I was not intending to go to Mexico in hopes of finding a mamacita, but because of what I managed to learn about transnational criminal operations. That was until I watched one WorldStarHipHop video, seeing the fallout from some tourists who managed to run afoul with locals who were involved with the cartel. So, I scratched that idea.

Realistically, if the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had offered a higher payout for their “Most Wanted” fugitives, as well as a multiplier incentive for catching more than one, I believe I could have netted them the Holy Trinity of narco-traffickers from the 2000s: El Chapo, El Mencho, El Mayo. The payout would have needed to be in excess of a 100-million dollars, and if they managed to throw in a pair of President George H.W. Bush’s aviator-styled eyeglasses, then I would have been over the top in my delivery of those fugitives. Serving up the three on a Tiffany & Co. silver platter, hog-tied (kinky), with an apple in each mouth.

What I find myself hypothesizing about most has to do with possibilities and probabilities. Like the possibility of transitioning from “your favourite gangster’s favourite gangster (digital)” to “your favourite Canadian’s favourite Canadian”, in the ranks of Thomas Clement Douglas (1904-1986) and Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1919-2000). Like the probability of bringing security and safety, peace and prosperity, a delivering a crippling blow against narco-terrorism and terrorism financing, possibly becoming Canada’s single-greatest contribution to USMCA (then NAFTA). Seeing how President Donald J. Trump is a New York-styled gentleman, doing the U.S. such a “yuuuge” favor, would Canada be in the position it is today with U.S. tariffs that are likely to decimate our economy? Absolutely not!

Seriously, are the stories about you true?

After meeting Snoop Dogg (A “Midnight Session” With Tha Doggfather), this past summer and lighting up a Snoop-rolled blunt for the first time in my life, one of the last things Snoop told me was that if we had gone to high school together that we would have been best homies. And while my response was that he was “hell yeah”, I also knew that we would have gotten expelled, or worse. Because Snoop’s green ways combined with my cyber ways would have made for a wild recipe.

Let us get back to the fact that the greatest hacks are seldom told, and the reality that Canadians are the most eccentric, ballsiest, and greatest hackers to ever walk the digital world. It will never be easy to believe that an Ottawa high school hacker would consider targeting police, organized criminal groups, and transnational crime syndicates. As hard as that scenario may be to fathom, what if I said that it was an Ottawa high school hacker who was the first to discover the issue of foreign interference (FI) in Canada, some 16 years ago before it was reported by an NGO?

As always, do not take my word for it, ask Canada’s public safety and policing stakeholders, whether the issue of FI was first uncovered in the Fall of 2008, by a then-seventeen-year-old Hillcrest High School student who also happened to be armed with a man purse. Because that story, and a few others, are ones that I need to save for the Netflix special!

Contrary to most of the coverage on the Hogue Report, which has been critical and criticizes it for understating the threat of FI, we should not forget that the Foreign Interference Commission had a separate set of findings that were classified and only meant for top officials in government and policing and public safety stakeholders (and is sealed for 99 years). The publicly available version of the Hogue Report speaks to threat of FI as it pertains to our elections and how government has responded to those threats. Parts of what was heard during the public hearings were omitted from the public report, with the omissions being attributed to the rigid terms of reference that were set out for this public inquiry and did not allow for an in-depth study of FI.

Much of the testimony offered during the public hearings that was left out of the Hogue Report should be described as takeaways that were more than the Foreign Interference Commission had accounted for. For instance, the critiques offered up by former CSIS Director Richard Fadden and former RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson, criticizing the Commission’s understanding of foreign interference, and countering most of the claims that government officials made during Stages 1 and 2, caught everyone by surprise. Yet, those who have not been following the Foreign Interference Commission for the entirety of its proceedings are unlikely to be aware of such instances.

The Lead up to the 51 Recommendations

On the day of the release of the Hogue Report, Commissioner Hogue stated how FI went far beyond the Foreign Interference Commission’s mandate and that it was too comprehensive and robust of an issue for the Commission to explore in the short period of time that it had. Although different segments of the population would have preferred if the Hogue Report would have been more specific in calling out certain countries involved in FI or detailing the full extent of transnational repression, the report highlights different FI tactics and delivers on its terms of reference. Overall, the Hogue Report offers important explanations and key conclusions about our democratic institutions and different aspects of Canadian life before getting into the 51 recommendations.

Some of the more important explanations focus on explaining why information has not always been shared with Parliamentarians, such as “parliamentary privilege” allowing Parliamentarians to speak in the House of Commons and making it impossible to prosecute them for whatever is said within. There was also a breakdown of the different kinds of intelligence that different stakeholders collect (foreign, security, criminal) and the ways they collect it (human sources, signals, open sources), but also why intelligence cannot always be used as evidence in criminal proceedings if a legal threshold is not met.

Other explanations include how collaboration across different levels of government is challenging because other levels of government do not have the infrastructure or capacity to process and store classified information,  yet the government is seeking to build information-sharing networks and has offered communications systems for provinces and territories up to the secret level. There was also a focus on the importance of a healthy media ecosystem and its importance in building citizen resilience to FI, how it is necessary for government to assist media organizations as they recalibrate around today’s digital landscape, and on the need for tools that verify whether digital content is fabricated or altered.

Some of key conclusions relate to how government often takes too long to act on key issues, coordination between various stakeholders has not been “optimal”, getting information to certain decision-makers has not been effective as it has needed to be, and government has proven itself to be a poor communicator and insufficiently transparent when it comes to FI. A few of the more surprising conclusions relate to the critique of Canada’s intelligence-sharing system and how it is broken and in need of a complete overhaul, including the RCMP needing to ensure more specialized training for officers on national security investigations, and that it was essential to intensify “inter-cooperation” efforts with every level of government, including Indigenous governments,  to successfully counter FI.

Four Criticisms Levied at The Hogue Report

Much of the criticism that has been levied towards the Hogue Report relates to positions taken by the Foreign Interference Commission on possibly compromised Parliamentarians, the absence of linking foreign interference activities to organized criminal groups, and the report’s usage of marginalizing language that diminished the threat of FI.

The biggest criticism related to the Hogue Report has to do with how it states that there is no evidence that there were “traitors” in Parliament, nor was there evidence to suggest that that our institutions have ever been seriously affected by FI. Additionally, Justice Hogue went on record to clarify that the NSICOP report that spoke of compromised Parliamentarians did not identify anyone by name. The problem with those suggestions is that they seem to disregard the fact that federal party leaders who had read the underacted NSICOP report have gone on record to state that the activities of some Parliamentarians did amount to treason. Additionally, it was also suggested during Stage 2 of the public hearings that elected officials who were identified as having engaged in troublesome behaviors were being asked to “step away” or “retire” from political life instead of policing stakeholders getting involved, as it was not in the public interest to stain public office.

A second criticism of the Hogue Report related to transnational repression and how the Foreign Interference Commission set up panels featuring ethnic Canadians who were leaders in their communities and who testified to being victims of such repression but ultimately felt that the information provided was outside the Commission’s terms of reference. Then there was specific testimony related to transnational repression offered up by policing and public safety stakeholders during Stage 1 and Stage 2, including detailed information sought by lawyers when questioning top officials on such repression and links to organized crime. At that point in time, all of it was relevant to the Foreign Interference Commission’s inquiry, but something changed as the Hogue Report states that transnational repression was determined to be outside of the Commission’s terms of reference.

A third criticism of the Hogue Report has to do with how it challenges the Right Honorable Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s assertion that the RCMP had evidence to suggest the killing of an ethnic Canadian was the result of a foreign government coordinating with organized criminal groups. That suggestion was made in the House of Commons, it was echoed to the media, and it was also mentioned during Stage 2. However, the Hogue Report states that “no definitive link to a foreign state could be proven”, nor was there any reference to organized criminal activities.

A fourth criticism of the Hogue Report is because it states that there were “a small number of isolated cases where foreign interference may have had some impact,”, but that the outcome of any of the elections was not swayed due to FI. And while that is entirely true, the Hogue Report seems to overlook testimony offered up by top CSIS officials that the issue of FI in electoral processes has been observed by CSIS for over 25 years, and that Canada has always been ill-equipped to address the issue.

My own criticism for the Foreign Interference Commission, which I feel has otherwise been stellar and delivered beyond what top officials had accounted for, stems from the belief that tech giants like Google, Meta, and X (formerly Twitter) should have been called to provide testimony on what they are doing to combat the misuse of their platforms. Much of the discussions regarding tech giants and their efforts to combat the misuse of their platforms made it seem as if they were either “wittingly or semi-wittingly” implicated in FI. From my interactions with some of those tech giants, every one of them was all-in on combating the misuse of their platforms.

An Op-ed by the Honourable Erin O’Toole

Former Conservative Party of Canada leader, the Honourable Erin O’Toole wrote an op-ed about how the most dangerous misconception about foreign interference in our democracy is the idea that it can be simplified into a discussion on traitors and treason – at least in this modern era. Additionally, Mr. O’Toole wrote how the Foreign Interference Commission was never about finding traitors or uncovering acts of treason, rather it was about examining the conduct of political leaders and their senior advisors over the past few years to determine if we were rising to meet this threat to our democracy. Additionally, Mr. O’Toole suggests that Canada has no meaningful enforcement against FI and no systemic way of tracking the financial ties of politicians to foreign entities, and that FI is only increasing.

What requires reflecting upon is that Mr. O’Toole decided against speaking on the issue of FI in the immediate aftermath of the election as not to undermine the integrity of our institutions. When he did address the matter some nine months after, it resulted in headlines and labels of being an “election denier”, “racist”, and more. The information landscape only changed after Canadians affected  by FI began to speak up after the intelligence leaks to the Globe and Mail happened. And this is what resulted in the creation of the Foreign Interference Commission. If it were not for that person(s) breaking the law by sharing confidential information, Mr. O’Toole may have been forced to carry the burden of those derogatory labels like “election denier” and “racist” despite not being either.

Aftermath of the Foreign Interference Commission

Seeing how the Foreign Interference Commission has concluded, there still exists an unexplored RCMP-angle that relates to testimony that was offered up by RCMP Commissioners Michael Duheme, Mark Flynn, and Brigitte Gauvin, about how none of them were personally aware of FI and that they learned about it from external sources. Such acknowledgments require exploring the RCMP’s approach to succession planning and whether the current process results in institutional knowledge erosion and organizational memory loss from those succession gaps.

What matters are things like the extent that new RCMP Commissioners get briefed on files related to the highest levels of national security, if at all. Whether there are limitations on what RCMP Commissioners are entitled to know, based on “need to know” scenarios. For instance, if former RCMP Commissioners William Elliot (2007-2011) or Bob Paulson (2011-2017) had been aware of FI, how does the RCMP account for knowledge attrition with the arrival of new RCMP Commissioners. Additionally, for an officer that moves up the rank and reaches the level of commissioner, what does the RCMP’s existing knowledge transfer mechanism look like if that officer has limited exposure to certain high-level investigations, that is, they are experienced dealing with transnational criminal files but not national security?

Having covered the entirety of the Foreign Interference Commission, my position regarding the FI is that a Canadian high school hacker in Ottawa came across FI activities back in the Fall of 2008. That high school hacker was me and my cyber activities related to FI is something I have been questioned about by persons in the policing and public safety ecosystem. And as it relates to my eight-page submission in response to the Foreign Interference Commission’s call for public feedback, my response focused on hacking policing stakeholders and organized criminal groups, but I did not mention hacking related to uncovering FI as a high schooler.

As such, I have reached out to the RCMP to inquire whether they could connect me with the three Commissioners, explaining how I wanted to explore the possibility that the “recently uncovered” FI was something that the RCMP may have been aware of pre-2010s, in at least Ottawa, and to cross-reference that with how the RCMP does “succession planning”. Depending on what that response looks like, it should make for a one-of-a-kind report. And while we wait to hear back from the RCMP, an earlier freedom-of-information request for access to a report on how the RCMP handles human sources that was submitted by the RCMP to NSIRA is going to take another 150 days before it is made available to us for review. So, until then, we wait.

The CHRC has advocated for changes to the Canadian Human Rights Act (The Act), which sets out who they can accept and investigate complaints from, excluding individuals without legal status to be in Canada even though they are accounted for in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under Section 40(5)(a) of the Act, it states that “no complaint in relation to a discriminatory practice may be dealt with by The CHRC under this part unless the act or omission that constitutes the practice…occurred in Canada and the victim of the practice was at the time of the act or omission either lawfully present in Canada or, temporarily absent from Canada, entitled to return to Canada.” This is an example of the structural discrimination in policy. As a result, individuals without legal status to be in Canada are ineligible to file complaints with the CHRC.

To the CHRC’s credit, it has long advocated for the repeal or amendment of this provision to increase access to human rights justice for all people in Canada, in line with the principles responsible for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. So, there are major implications regarding the various threats that migrants are facing in Canada because there are significant barriers preventing them from obtaining policing services, having their matters adjudicated by federal and provincial courts, and accessing other public-serving bodies that most Canadians take for granted, and it has created for a major public safety issue.

Revisiting A Previous Article

In a previous article, “Immigration Realities: Canada through Migrant Eyes”, what came as shock during my participation at a Canada-wide gathering of more than 400 different organizations that work with and serve refugees and migrants, was how organized criminal groups (including the Hells Angels) have managed to embed themselves into the immigration ecosystem (internationally and domestically). Three examples stuck out:

The first example saw a migrant who landed in Western Canada receive a message over a chat app that gave them specific instructions to arrive to their “workplace” in Quebec. They were told to take a Via Rail train to Montreal, and after arriving to Montreal they were told to take an Uber to a place 1.5 hours away from the train station. Upon arriving to the “new” workplace, they were told that they would only receive 20% of their agreed upon salary in Canadian Dollars and the other 80% would be paid in Mexican Pesos, to their family in Mexico, by someone who would be visiting their family in Mexico. Such arrangements were not said to be exceptions to the rule in places where organized criminal groups have embedded themselves.

The second example saw migrants turn to the RCMP (who were contracted for policing responsibilities in the area) to report kidnapping and extortion, and how the RCMP turned away those victims and suggested that they reach out to a different level of policing for support. In the end, all three levels of policing (municipal, provincial, federal) would offer similar responses for the victims by stating that their complaints were outside their scope and jurisdiction.

The third example saw organizations establishing early warning systems and enhanced safety measures for employees who had been targets of intimidation by organized criminal elements. As a result, out-of-city visits now require constant communication between staff, and organizations also collect identifying information on suspicious persons and vehicles and share that information with other local organizations due to not being able to rely on law enforcement.

Most of the participants at the three-day immigration summit had unfavorable views of police, and there were suggestions that insinuated Canada’s police were systemically racist and underprioritizing migrant-related matters. Even though such suggestions may have some truth, it is possible the turning away of such victims had something to do with the existence of high-level policing investigations and a need to preserve such investigations or perhaps these were cases where police felt there was a low likelihood of securing a criminal conviction against organized criminal elements and decided they were not worth investigating.

Both thoughts are disturbing, however, in that individuals who were victims of crime in Canada could get overlooked after turning to law enforcement. However, they also offer up deeper considerations into the world of policing, one that often revolves around police statements like, “we are unable to speak to the details of any specific case, or any potential criminal investigations”.

Canada’s Most Underprivileged and Disadvantaged

Based on preliminary discussions with a few municipal police officers thus far, it was explained that if a municipal police officer ever happens to deal with someone that they identify as being without legal status to be in Canada, then they must detain that person and notify the CBSA (police of jurisdiction). The reason given for that response was that anything having to do with immigration fell outside the jurisdiction of municipal policing responsibilities, and municipal police officers did not have room to apply discretion when dealing with victims of crime who were without legal status to be in Canada.

Policing and public safety stakeholders in Canada have gone on record stating that while police-reported incidents of human trafficking increase every year, the number of human trafficking related convictions remains relatively low. More so, they have stated how assessing the extent of human trafficking in Canada is difficult due to its clandestine nature and the reluctance of victims and witnesses to come forward to law enforcement, as well as challenges in identifying victims. Most cases of human trafficking are never reported to police due to threats from traffickers, fear, shame, and mistrust of authorities. So, all the current available data provides only a partial representation of the scope and scale of human trafficking in Canada, and practically none on migrants and individuals without legal status to be in Canada.

Steps have been taken to better equip law enforcement and prosecutors on the scope, scale and sensitivities around human trafficking to better identify cases and enhance the consistency in prosecution. As it pertains to migrants, Canada has also acted to better protect such individuals by investing $3.4 million over two years to establish, on a pilot basis, a migrant worker support network dealing with potential mistreatment or abuse, and even to propose recommendations that account for the migrant experience. Additional successes include the Government issuing 146 (January 2016-December 2018) temporary resident permits to victims of human trafficking and their dependents, but there are limitations. Getting migrant victims to turn to police for help and to want to help with criminal prosecutions requires establishing trust and is something money cannot buy.

Seeing how the Canadian Human Rights Commission is prohibited from accepting human rights complaints from individuals without legal status to be in Canada, the police response further complicates the issue of human rights as it pertains to migrants and others without legal status. Migrants and individuals without legal status who lack the financial means to retain a lawyer for a matter related to human rights, may find it worth connecting with civil rights organizations to see if they have experience dealing with such matters.

Canada’s approach to human trafficking has been guided by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its supplementing Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and has been organized around four broad pillars (4Ps): the prevention of trafficking; the protection of victims; the prosecution of offenders; and working in partnership with others. There are more intersections to a complex issue than past policies have been capable of accounting for, which this series may succeed in highlighting.

In Comparison

Compared to the rest of the world, Canada does immigration better than practically every other country. Being better than others, however, is a low standard when being viewed as “better” overshadows bettering immigration-related gaps. Canada may be limited in what it can do about immigration-related exploitation that occurs outside of Canada, but we are in full control on how we respond to the exploitation of those who our current laws overlook and disregard.

When migrants lose their legal status to stay in Canada, that process is more complicated than is understood by people or has been described in the media. All of it can be chalked up to complex immigration processes, systemic flaws, and socio-economic factors. Additionally, factors related to language barriers, social isolation and the inability to access public services, and these are the vulnerabilities that traffickers aim to exploit. For those Canadians who are not that far removed from their “first step off the boat and onto Canadian soil”, or who have heard first-hand accounts about those “first steps” from family, today’s victims could be “us”.

Both German and Japanese automakers, like Volkswagen and Nissan, have long benefited from protectionist policies and subsidies provided by their respective governments. Those advantages are largely responsible for German and Japanese automakers being able to match American automakers, across North and South America. But American automakers across North America have also been the benefactors of major bailouts in the late 2000s ($80 billion in the US and $13.7 billion in Canada), with the detailed terms and conditions regarding not being made public.

Seeing how everything in today’s information landscape is about manufactured narratives that are designed to “other”, not factual breakdowns, a deeper look into the automotive industry becomes important. Because German, Japanese and American automakers had an unprecedented head start on Chinese automakers, that they should never have had to worry about getting supplanted.

A Lack of Aggressive Investments

Hearing legacy automakers blame Chinese automakers for the major layoffs and plant closures has been a bold deflection away from the decades of bad thinking that has been exhibited by all automaker executives. Throughout the past 20 years, there have been consecutive years where the only changes that legacy automakers have made to some of their best-selling car lines were minor changes to the exterior and interior of those vehicles. Instead of blaming China and Chinese automakers, the blame should fall on an obsolete way of thinking that has dominated the automaking industry, the Minor Model Change (MMC).

The MMC approach is an approach to R&D that advocates for minor facelifts to “renew” a vehicle line instead of major improvements. Some examples of MMC thinking includes updating rim designs, headlight and taillight designs, bumper designs, steering wheel designs, and interior fabric colors. Although “redesigned rims” may sound cool, the main reason for the rim design is to make it so that “used” alternatives from previous years are not compatible and owners have to buy the new-styled rims. So, while legacy automakers were focusing on doing the bare minimum, Chinese automakers were working to develop superior EV technology and battery production.

Most legacy automakers deliberately overlooked creating distinct car lines for many of the world’s developing economies because it would have required them to make cheaper vehicles, while Chinese automakers saw value in those same markets. Now that Chinese automakers have managed to build-up a sizable advantage over legacy automakers, some social media accounts with major followings were posting how Chinese autoworkers get paid as little as $300-$400 CAD per month, which was suggested to be the primary reason why they are able to produce such affordable car lines. Such a claim is false because the average blue-collar worker was earning closer to $1,400 CAD (7215 Yuan) per month, and the real reason for their success is that Chinese automakers have managed to scale their way to the top by focusing on the same developing economies that legacy automakers disregarded.

After entering the 21^st century with practically no global car market share, Chinese auto brands are becoming to go-to choice thanks to their clean energy technologies (something that legacy automakers fought against). Thus, legacy automakers should take accountability for embracing MMC-thinking and not pursuing aggressive R&D strategies, instead of blaming China and Chinese automakers. Had legacy automakers decided to pursue aggressive investments into future technologies and technological advancements, there is no scenario where they would have had to worry about getting supplanted.

Chinese Minister He Guangyuan’s thinking directly contributed to automaking successes

At the start of the 21^st century, China had little capacity to produce cars. Before that, in 1985, China was barely producing any cars. The Soviet Union was dominant exporter of cars to China, prior to being unseated by Japanese automakers. Then in the 2000s, things began to change as China went from producing 2 million vehicles (2000) to 29 million (2017), and their global market share of rose from 3% (2000) to 30% (2017).

During a dip in 2012 that saw Chinese automakers lose some of their market share, former Minister of Machinery and Electronics Industry and Minister of Machine-Building Industry, He Guangyuan, made remarks that challenged China rethink about how it thought about automaking. Those comments were a critique of Chinese automakers for relying too much on assembling foreign cars and not enough on developing vehicles from scratch.

In 2015, China introduced a “Made in China 2025” policy, a nation-wide effort, that focused on upgrading manufacturing capabilities across multiple industries, including automaking. China also introduced measures that required legacy automakers to establish joint ventures with Chinese automakers to produce vehicles in the country (50/50). These measures were introduced after local manufactures started to face existential challenges, to help bridge the technology gap and to help develop Chinese brands. Eventually these requirements were lifted and legacy automakers like VOLVO and BMW took control over their joint ventures.

The ”Made in China 2025” policies were focused on changing China’s reputation from being the world’s go-to for cheap low-tech goods to becoming a powerhouse in the production of advanced technologies, but also to decouple its industries from reliance on other countries. These policies incentivized R&D by reducing tax rates for high-tech companies, incentivizing M&As of foreign technology companies, and even included funding for greater investments in R&D. In lay terms, their strategic approach focused on building up more R&D centers, more sustainable production with an end-goal of becoming a leader in green manufacturing, becoming more active in smart manufacturing, and ensuring long-term access to key materials necessary for production.

How successful has the “Made in China 2025” been? In 2022, the market share of Chinese car brands in China eclipsed 50%, while German and Japanese automakers both fell under 20%. By 2024, Chinese automakers had accounted for over 25% of the global auto market share, and Chinese automakers accounted for 4In. Practically all these successes can be traced back to the decision to pursue aggressive investments into future technologies and technological advancements, something that legacy automakers chose against doing.

The moral of this automaking outcome has to do with privilege

If head starts mattered, then Henry Ford’s (1863-1947) decedents would have made sure that the only car that was being driven around the world today was a Ford Motor Company vehicle. Instead, the company that was made great by old man Ford has squandered their head start and now rank eighth in global auto market share. Had Ford Motor Company (run by the Ford family) stayed true to old man Ford’s principles, it would rank as the most dominant automaker, one that no other automaker could ever supplant.

An automaker like Tesla, and Chinese automakers, would never have come into existence had Ford Motor Company (run by the Ford family) not squandered what was an unprecedented head start: old man Ford revolutionized factory production, and was the first to establish five-day work weeks and to offer comprehensive pay and benefits to his workers. Old man Ford’s goal was to make automobiles affordable and accessible to the average person (thinking that Ford descendants chose to deviate from, while Chinese automakers fully embraced), and to transform society by making transport available to as many people as possible. Additionally, old man Ford believed in fostering social mobility and economic growth by utilizing mass production and through innovation (also thinking that Ford descendants chose to deviate from, while Chinese automakers fully embraced).

Perhaps the moral of this automaking outcome is that having the privilege of a head start in today’s world means very little. Inheriting competitive advantages means nothing if those same advantages are not being expanded upon, by working hard and creating more, and if complacency kicks in. Even with a commitment to working hard and creating more anything short of working the hardest and creating the most can allow an underdog to become the favourite.

Just before Prime Minister Trudeau’s speech was set to begin, there was a targeted disinformation attack conducted through YouTube’s advertising services. More specifically, bad actors were targeting Minister Chrystia Freeland with AI-generated images of Minister Freeland in handcuffs, with ridiculous text stamped over those images and with real-looking logos at the bottom, including the CBC News logo. Then, clicking on the image would spoof an identical-looking website of the Toronto Star. These attack ads continued to persist for more than three weeks, expanding to include other political party leaders in Canada.

Looking into the YouTube attack ads only required a quick toggle for me to figure out how easy it was to exploit and weaponize digital advertising. Then tracking the disinformation attacks that were happening over X (formerly Twitter), X was taking down AI-generated disinformation attack posts that were being made by verified accounts, but bad actors had managed to identify a grey area loophole. Countless bot accounts were posting screenshots of those same posts (by verified accounts) that X had taken down, effectively reposting those images.

Both the attacks that were taking place over YouTube and X were disinformation attacks, but how many Canadians were likely to be aware of go-to strategies and capable of seeing the disinformation attacks for the garbage that they were? That question and others like it made it worth connecting with Google (owners of YouTube) as well as with the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and even checking-in with those targeted by disinformation attack ads.

The Story Behind the Disinformation Ads

As it related to the disinformation attacks targeting Minister Chrystia Freeland, there were at least five different photos portraying Minister Freeland being taken away in handcuffs (in court and in public settings), with at least 6 different advertising accounts being manipulated to appear responsible for running these ads: “TravelTrekkify”, “LufaTech”, “BerinaTravel”, “GossipFad”, “TravelJetSets”, and even “CBC News” with their logo.

All the photos had messages that read, “Chrystia Freeland – Is this the end of her career? A scandal that shocked the entire Canadian nation.”, “The real reason behind Freeland’s resignation.”, “She didn’t notice that the camera was filming.”, “She thought it was safe to say what she thought.”, “The nation of Canada was surprised.”, and “Good news for Canadians.”. Specific to the fake “CBC News” ad, there was only a photo of Minister Freeland and no text in the image, but beneath the image was the CBC News logo and two lines reading, “The nation of Canada was surprised. The real reason behind Freeland’s resignation.”, and in the sponsored section beneath that ad, it showed “Sponsored · CBC News”. Then clicking the image would spoof an identical-looking website of the Toronto Star – it was scary how good it was.

One of the great things about Google ads, though, is that each ad features a transparency center that allows users to look over the advertising history for advertisers whose ads appear over Google’s different platforms. Clicking on the “My Ad Center” option for those AI-generated images, it only took two seconds to figure out the “how” behind the disinformation attack.

Clicking on the “My Ad Center” section, there was a disclaimer about how Google had “verified” the identity of the advertiser, “AirCruise B.V.” who was in “Netherlands”. Every single one of the disinformation attack ads targeting Minister Freeland that I clicked on went back to this company in the Netherlands. The only variation between them related to the “topic” category for the ad, “travel booking services”, “legal”, “clothing”, and “gardening”. Clicking on the option to “See more ads this advertiser has shown using Google” showed a bunch of fake looking ads about random things related to business, cartoons, fashion, traveling and nutrition, used to build up their “trust score”, with an occasional “surprise” every few hundred fake ads.

What came as the biggest surprise was the discovery of additional disinformation attack ads that targeted non-elected public figures like Wayne Gretzky, and even Brazilian public figures were targeted, with those ads reading in Portuguese. Those disinformation attack ads that targeted the likes of Wayne Gretzky as well as the ones that were done in less advanced countries seemed to be beta tests to determine how YouTube would respond, in preparation for the disinformation attack ads that would eventually take place during Canadian elections.

Google Leading the Fight Against Deepfake Technology

Google’s press office responded to my query about the disinformation attack ads targeting Minister Freeland by stating that those and other similar ads were removed and that they had suspended “AirCruise B.V.” Additionally, Google was looking deeper into this specific ad vulnerability, and it should be safe to assume that Canadians are not going to have to worry about disinformation attack ads through Google’s ad services for the upcoming election.

Google referenced their “misrepresentation policy” that prohibits the use of manipulated media to deceive, defraud or mislead users around issues related to politics, social issues, or matters of public concern, and ads that use a public figures likeness to deceive people are permanently suspended. Also prohibited are advertisers concealing or mistaking information about their business, product or service, nor is it permitted to imply affiliation with or endorsement by another individual, organization, product, or service without their consent.

Google detailed how they have been investing heavily into detection and enforcement programs to counter deep fakes ads through image recognition technology and having models to detect public figure depictions in videos. Google suggested they literally had a team of thousands working around the clock to create and enforce their policies at scale. The driving force behind nearly all the enforcement successes was Gemini (Google’s AI), which is how they were able to block billions of ads, many before a person ever sees them. Google also cited their recent “Ads Safety Report”, highlighting how Google has removed over 5.5 billion ads (slightly up from last year), restricted over 6.9 billion ads and suspended over 12.7 million advertiser accounts (double from last year).

In 2023, Google blocked or removed 206.5 million ads that violated their misrepresentation policy, 273.4 million advertisements for violating their financial services policy, and over 1 billion advertisements for violating their policy against abusing the ad network, including some that promoted malware. As it relates to elections, Google had verified more than 5,000 new election advertisers and removed more than 7.3 million election ads that came from advertisers who did not complete verification. Additionally, Google was the first tech company to launch a new disclosure requirement for election ads containing synthetic content to account for advertisers who may leverage the power and opportunity of AI, that such content was labelled and transparent. So, Google was all-in on ensuring that its services were not getting misused, especially for election interference purposes.

The CSE, Global Affairs Canada, and Those Targeted

Despite that the CSE has been involved in a national-wide advertising campaigns to raise awareness regarding multi-layered disinformation attacks and other scams, it is not responsible for monitoring Canadian social media for online disinformation as it is not a part of their mandate. Rather, the CSE Act prohibits the CSE from directing its activities at Canadians or at anyone in Canada, and those responding reported that it was focused on monitoring global trends and drawing attention to emerging cyber threats. However, I believe that those prohibitions are likely to change seeing how the Foreign Interference Commission has suggested Canada needs to actively monitor all sources of open-source information (OSINT) for disinformation, which is occurring year-round.

As it related to the “screen capture” loophole over X, that disinformation attack-style was shared with Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and it seemed to be one that was not on anyone’s radar. Additionally, GAC confirmed that they would be interested in providing more insight into their Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) which works to counter foreign interference – for an upcoming issue.

The Toronto Star responded by stating that it knew bad actors were spoofing their websites, but it had been going on over the past year or so, and that other mainstream outlets like the CBC and Globe were also affected, but these media outlets were powerless to do anything about it. The CBC responded by stating it was aware of an increase in spoofs targeting the CBC and CBC-employees over social media platforms and websites, and that they are working to curb this alarming trend to remove the disinformation ads.

Beta-Testing Disinformation

What if the first round of AI-generated “get rich quick” video ads over YouTube that featured AI-generated versions of Canadian media personalities were meant to serve as beta-tests for bad actors to conduct disinformation attacks during elections, aka foreign interference? What if there are similar beta tests being conducted at this moment in less advanced countries that are out of sight for GAC’s RRM, and unlikely to be on anyone’s radar?

The end-goal of all these disinformation YouTube ads may simply be to get a vulnerable person to click on the ad and then to get them to share their personal information, but it is certain to be a go-to strategy to undermine the upcoming provincial and federal elections. And maybe the dis/misinformation attacks that should scare Canadians the most are the ones occurring over X, the resharing of AI-generated photos (dis/misinformation) of posts that X takes down, in the form of screenshots.

If AI Can Create Problems, then AI Can Solve Problems.

A techie friend of mine who works for Shopify once explained how all major tech companies have adopted anti-crime and anti-fraud methodologies that make it practically impossible for criminals to exploit digital services and platforms. None of the methodologies came as a surprise, but what shocked me was a stat he referenced about how nearly every cyber exploitation could be traced back to someone on the “inside”.

For example, Shopify assigns specific code teams to work on specific “links” in the “chain” and no team is aware of the “full chain”, to reduce the likelihood of exploitations. So, when Shopify experienced a “breach” many years ago, the combination of their AI-powered systems and their forensic teams saw everything fixed before a person could blink. Within seconds, the “breach” was patched. Within minutes, the “red alert” reached those who needed to know. Within the hour, there was a list of coders that had worked on the “link”. Within the day, key information was shared with police about the digital footprints of everything.

All the big tech giants have long been involved in the war on cybercrime by leveraging AI-powered tools and cyber forensic teams to prevent the exploitation and misuse of their digital services and platforms, and all will cooperate with policing stakeholders regarding all criminal matters. Despite that most Canadians are unlikely to be aware of those successes, or how they are made possible, these efforts have proven to be extremely successful at helping police stay ahead of criminals that attempt to exploit technology for criminal purposes.

One example of AI-powered benevolence can be seen with how all the major gaming consoles leverage AI to monitor the conversations (text and voice) that take place in online gaming settings between “gamers”. That AI-powered monitoring system was able to help identify a terror attack in the making, and police were able to get ahead and eliminate the threat to public safety.

Another example of AI-powered benevolence can be seen with how all the major cloud storage services leverage AI to scan every photo and video that gets uploaded to the cloud and they can identify files associated with crimes like human trafficking, drug and weapon trafficking, and major violence. That AI-powered monitoring system was also able to identify accounts that uploaded photos and videos of child pornography, and police were able to bust a large pedophile ring.

What should matter most when it comes to today’s AI should be that today’s AI is the dumbest version of AI that will ever exist, still more capable than humans. Eventually, we will get to a point where AI is so sophisticated that it will be impossible to misuse digital services and platforms, making for a much safer world. In the meantime, for upcoming elections across Canada, and the world for that matter, the good guys have two less disinformation attack-styles to worry about. As for hostile state actors, The Voice Magazine might just be behind the “bat symbol” in the sky.

Lucky for society, we are only 20 years or so removed from the peak era of random kids exploiting cyber vulnerabilities from their parents’ basement or whatever other room the family computer was located. This means we are living in a time that will go down as the pioneer era of the internet, and we can turn to former cyber enthusiasts for some, as they say, “cool stories, bro”. The similarity between cyber-enthusiasts and the pioneers from early North America is that both manage to “turn assertion into reality. They were a band of rebels who defeated the reigning incumbent of their eras,” as claimed by Vivek Ramaswamy

So, here is a story of how the early pioneers of the internet combined intellectual curiosity and an absolute confidence in their ability to figure things out through self-education and curiosity, figured out how the internet worked. And how network vulnerabilities do not exist to be exploited by kids in their parents’ basement or whatever other room the family computer is in, as you might fall into the crosshairs of the greatest police force the world has ever known, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

“Anonymous” Cyber Enthusiasts as Kang Variants

That hacking group, commonly referred to as “Anonymous”, owe their name to a high-level discussion among policing stakeholders and elected officials, “We have no idea who the hell they are. They’re anonymous, sir.” And from that high-level discussion emerged the name that would get labelled on a global group of loosely connected cyber enthusiasts.

Looking back to the early days of the dark web and hacker groups, the reason they were so mysterious and hard for police to crack has to do with how people had to “earn” invites into such exclusive chatrooms. Back then, getting an invite into such exclusive chatrooms required going through a process like what Homer Simpson went through to get into the Stone Cutters (Season 6, Episode 12). It required finding network vulnerabilities and sending them over to a select few “admins” who would then go and verify these vulnerabilities, and, once confirmed, a person would get an invite into such exclusive chatrooms. And the anthem that was adopted by these exclusive chatrooms was the 1997 Simpsons song, “We do (The Stonecutters’ Song)”. Seriously.

Perhaps the funniest thing about these “Anonymous” cyber enthusiasts is that despite only knowing each other by code names, nearly all of them were identical in personality—a bunch of Kang variants (Council of Kangs): inhumanely immature, religious about gangster rap, a wannabe p*mp, hall-of-fame level funny, and everything they did they were “doing it for the lulz”. These were individuals who are so eccentric that none of the Hollywood greats could play such characters because of how unbelievable they were. And if you want to try to imagine them, think of the Council of Kangs from the Marvel Cinematic Universe – a stadium full of Kang variants.

Perhaps the main reason as to why police struggled to get into those exclusive chatrooms had to do with police not being allowed to commit crimes, so they would not be able to pass the “network vulnerabilities test”. Instead, they would have to catch individuals with access to such exclusive chatrooms once they got involved in traditional criminal activity, then get them to flip. After police stakeholders backdoored their way into these exclusive chatrooms through cooperation agreements, all the chat logs they gathered probably had policing and public safety stakeholders crapping themselves, first from laughter, and then for the seriousness of the situation.

Personally, I am convinced that the only reason that most network vulnerabilities were identified when they were by network administrators, had to do with how these “Anonymous” cyber enthusiasts lived for “doing it for the lulz”. What that means is that network vulnerabilities would be openly shared in such exclusive chatrooms, with the shared understanding that members would not go and exploit all those vulnerabilities. But “Anonymous” cyber enthusiasts lived for the “lulz”, meaning they laughed at the chaos that these exploits would cause, and they tried their darndest for them to get media coverage—so that they could laugh.

All things being equal, still I stand by my claims that Canadians are the most eccentric, ballsiest, and greatest hackers to ever walk the digital world (it’s not even close), but also that Canadian hackers also mature the slowest (it’s also not even close). But eccentric and ballsy hackers might end up being the peeps who save our world.

Iranian Hackers and the Cool Telephone Number

Back in July of 2020, I decided I wanted to get a new number because my then-number was too epic, “343-777-8-999” for my age. Because I had finally matured and could no longer use jokes that I use to get away with, “hit the jackpot twice”, and a whole bunch of other punchlines that would make all the rapper greats from the 2000s super proud. So, I turned to Freedom Mobile, who had a wickedly good deal, that gave more GBs of data than I could ever use. Because who is not a glutton for excess GBs of data so that they can post the most vain-glorious selfies?

Anyway, Freedom Mobile has personality and that must count for something, because the shit that I got put through was like getting hit by a Mack Truck (which does not turn those hit into “Mack Daddys”.) First, there was an issue with my number change, I was in Ottawa, but I wanted a “new area code” number from Northern Ontario because of the “cool” number sequences they made available. And that desire broke Freedom Mobile’s system.

Initially, I got a “cool” number, changing it out for all my social media accounts, that was before I got a call from Freedom Mobile telling me that I had to get a number specific to the Ottawa due to my address. After wasting close to 30-minutes of Freedom Mobile’s call center representative’s time, going through over hundreds of different phone number sequences, I settled on a “Dragon Ball Z-styled” sequence that ended in “9000” (power level scouter). Less than 48 hours later, I started getting spammed. Then I started getting locked out of some of my social media accounts, and more. Eventually, I started getting messages and calls over WhatsApp wanting to know who I was. So, I sent them a link to my website, then asking them who the hell were they and why the hell were they messaging me.

As a long story short, it turned out that the number that I was issued the number of a Canadian victim of the Airlines Flight 752 (January 8, 2020), Mansour Pourjam. By then, I had already changed my primary number to the “Dragon Ball Z-styled” number, and I was not letting it go. So, hackers, who I can only assume were Iranian, and not “Anonymous”-related (or we might recognize each other), carried out a barrage of attacks. Seeing that Canadian law made it illegal for me to procure the necessary grey market software necessary to engage with the Iranian hackers, I leveraged my public policy background (Harvard Kennedy School ’21) and put out a series on the growing importance of telephone numbers in a digital world.

Perhaps the biggest takeaway from that series has to do with how we undervalue the importance of telephone numbers in today’s digital world and how fast telephone numbers are getting recycled—less than 3 months after an account has been closed (whether intentionally or for an unpaid balance). But a lot about how people interact with the digital world remains unaccounted for, and it may catch up to us at some point.

PSA: Hack Around and Find Out Courtesy of the FBI

Back in 2022, I attended a luncheon organized by Canadian Club of Ottawa that focused on the future of cybersecurity in Canada, and the conversations that I had with international cybersecurity practitioners told an entirely different story than what gets reported in the media. So, I have no idea why so many media outlets continue to quote “digital and cybersecurity analysts”, who keep saying that there is nothing that can be done about the illegal activity that occurs over the internet.

In summary, quantum computing and AI-powered technologies are being utilized to account for the rise in cybercrimes and the misuse of digital platforms. Joining that war on crime are internet providers who are actively monitoring IP activity and will flag specific searches for things like downloading pirated software, things related to terrorism and sex crimes, and if someone gets on the “dark web”. However, if there was one takeaway from my conversations with those international cybersecurity practitioners at the luncheon, it was that “As good as Canada’s RCMP may be, and as good as other country’s federal policing services may be, there is only one FBI.”

What the hell does that mean, Alek? Well, one hacker in the Ottawa-Gatineau region, a 30-year-old manchild at the time of his hacking activities, decided he wanted to “hack around” – the FBI decided to help him “find out”. That man-child hacker made the mistake of hacking a US-government computer (you should have targeted Cuba, Iran, North Korea or Russia, brother), and so the FBI got involved.

In short, the FBI tracked him down rather quickly.   What took them time was paperwork related to him being located outside of U.S. borders. But when the FBI landed in Ottawa, their agents came out with detection dogs. Canadian policing stakeholders were surprised and wondering, “Why did the FBI come with detection dogs? Did this expand to a drug case?” After the man-child hacker was captured, Canadian policing stakeholders learned that the FBI had dogs that were trained to detect the scents of computer hacking chips. Nobody in Canada knew such dogs even existed or could be trained to do so.

So I repeat, what the colt revolver did to the bow and arrow is what quantum computers and AI-powered solutions have done to hackers—so stop hacking.

After going over the entire report, however, what came as a shock was how there was not a single use of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime. Why is that a big deal? Because Canada’s top officials, including elected officials, policing and public safety leaders, academics, industry practitioners, and other key stakeholders all acknowledged that organized crime was a critical factor in how hostile states conducted FI in their attempts to undermine our democracy. Without organized criminal elements, hostile states would almost certainly be relegated to carrying out FI over digital platforms. But by leaving out any mention of crime, the Public Consultation Report undermined key takeaways from Stage 1, Stage 2 and the Policy Phase of the Foreign Interference Commission, which all established organized crime as being a key factor in FI.

Having been accredited with the Foreign Interference Commission, I reached out to The Commission for comment on the absence of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime, and why there is no mention of the role that organized crime plays, and whether that meant that there was no mention of it in public submissions. The initial response from The Commission was that it was unlikely that they would provide a comment on those matters, later responding by saying that the report summarized themes raised and discussed in the written submissions and questionnaire responses. Yet, The Commission’s decision to leave out any mention of the criminal components of FI undermines what has otherwise been a stellar display of the potential of public inquiries has otherwise been.

Seeing how I also submitted an 8-page submission—one providing specific details about how individuals who were providing access to illegal gambling services had succeeded (deceived) in getting a popular Member of Parliament (who won’t be named) to speak (during a previous election) at an event that was organized at their establishment, and having made a campaign donation the day before the event—this absence made no sense.

What makes the incident that I referenced more troubling is the fact that public safety and policing stakeholders were aware of what would transpire, but they chose not to notify that elected official. The fallout from that series of events and my reporting on the Foreign Interference Commission is that I have since received specific praises from individuals in the policing and public safety ecosystem and even “follows” over social platforms from Members of Parliament who are active on national security matters. Whether The Commission decides to disregard the crime intersection of FI in their final report remains to be seen.

In the meantime, however, it is worth looking at two major precedents that are likely to be set related to the time it takes to conduct a public inquiry and the phasing out of “policy phases” from future inquiries, and revisiting some key moments from the Foreign Interference Commission that were underreported on.

A New Precedent for Public Inquiry Timeframes

Over the past few decades, public inquiries dealing with major issues have often taken between three to seven years and would often address systemic or historical matters that were thought to require extensive research, hearings and public consultations. Those timeframes have always been determined by governments, who are responsible for setting the “terms of reference”. For example, the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada took 4 years (1993-1997), the Commission of Inquiry on the Air India Bombing lasted 4 years (2006-2010), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission took 7 years (2008-2015), and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls took 3 years (2016-2019).

One of the major impacts of the Foreign Interference Commission, outside of its mandate, relates to the precedent that will get set about how a public inquiry into a major issue can be conducted in around a year’s time. Completing a public inquiry on a major issue like national security matters in around a year’s time, this commission should permanently change how democratic governments around the world think about public inquiries. As a result, the multi-year approach to doing public inquiries may be on its way out, but speedy inquiries into major issues also have the potential to rebuild trust in government and democratic institutions.

Policy Phases Phased Out?

How the Policy Phase of the Foreign Interference Commission unfolded, with academics and industry practitioners speaking without restraint about Canada’s national security shortfalls, all of it undermined and even questioned the veracity of previous testimonies that were offered up by Canada’s top officials (current and former). What made the testimonies during the Policy Phases so shocking was that they were being made by top diplomats, former RCMP Commissioners and CSIS directors. Aacademics and industry practitioners practically countered what Canada’s top officials had been testifying about in stages one and two, and also challenged the Commission’s understanding of FI.

Nobody may have imagined that they would hear some of Canada’s most accomplished and recognizable security experts make admissions like how policing stakeholders often decided against pursuing criminal investigations related to high-level organized crime or how CSIS warrants were incapable of meeting the high legal standard required for intelligence to be used in criminal prosecutions. Or would hear things like how FI was not at the root of all the erosion of trust in political parties and institutions, but that it was the result of individuals and institutional scandals over the decades and how Canada was involved in FI and never critical of FI activities when conducted by friendly states. The Commission also heard things like how a new “gold standard” that moved away from aggressive criminal prosecutions would further erode trust in policing and undermine Canada’s sovereignty.

Despite that the Policy Phase panels provided more detail and greater insight into the threat posed by FI and its different intersections than Stage 1 and Stage 2 combined, it was likely more than what was bargained for. Even though the different panels greatly improved the quality of the Foreign Interference Commission, having such academics and industry practitioners speaking without any restraints can be unfavorable for governments and institutions—especially when elections are at stake. As such, I believe future inquiries regarding major issues may see “policy phases” conducted separately from public hearings because of how much was learned about FI from the Policy Phase, and how it undermined and even questioned the veracity of previous testimonies offered up by Canada’s top officials.

Underreported Moments

Being the only person covering the Foreign Interference Commission from an academic perspective and exploring relevant public policy intersections related to foreign interference, I felt there were some key moments that seem to have been underreported on. Here are three of those moments.

First, some parties submitted key documents in the early morning hours and only hours before being set to testify, undermining the scheduled proceedings and complicating the question-asking process. Thankfully, Commissioner Hogue routinely provided lawyers with time extensions to ask final follow up questions, which is not the norm when it comes to public inquiries but allowed for greater takeaways.

Second, The Commission seemed to decide against having diaspora community leaders from across Canada provide testimony under oath. Having testimony offered on something as serious as FI that is not tied to any oath undermined those ethnic leaders and relegated their comments to mere hearsay. No clear answer as to why this decision was made has been provided.

Third, an observer waited for the end of day (during Stage 2) before standing up from his seat and staging a vocal protest by speaking directly to Justice Hogue, highlighting their experience as an Arab-Canadian being targeted by hostile state actors. The Commission’s security protection team was on top of the situation, but they did not intervene, and Justice Hogue addressed the individual directly regarding their comments. A surprisingly well-handled situation.

Organized Crime and the Final Report

Whether or not The Commission decides to disregard the crime intersection of FI in their final report remains to be seen, but it was the single item that had consensus among everyone who provided testimony about how FI works. The absence of the word “crime” or any reference to organized crime in the Public Consultation Report makes the contents of the final report less predictable. Either way, we will find out soon, as The Hogue Report will be published by January 31st, 2025.

1. Say What You’re For

“Saying what you’re for” is rooted in identifying ways to counter opposing messages and narratives while establishing one’s own message. For instance, if all a person does is talk about their opposition, they will end up repeating the opposition’s message, which is not good. Instead, it is possible to continue calling out the opposition, but it requires focusing on not repeating their positions. That means focusing on establishing things like what you are for and what kind of things could be made possible.

There were two examples that were referenced to demonstrate an evolving message and the power of effective messaging. The first example was a human rights campaign related to Australia’s policies of “caging people”, and how messaging around that human rights issue had evolved from 2013 to 2015 to 2016. The second example referenced a commercial that highlighted an immigration policy separating families and focused on humanizing the issue. Both examples were described as fitting into the “beautiful tomorrow” opportunity that every situation possessed, a better tomorrow that all people desire for.

2. Remember: People Do Things

Societal problems have always been the result of people-created problems. If people can create problems, then people can fix the problems they create so long as it is clear about the origin story of the problems and how they are people-created. That is the essence of “people do things”.

The norm across today’s advocacy landscape features lots of messaging that involves “inagentive constructions”, language that makes it unclear who exactly causes specific harms. Examples of inagentive language that were highlighted included, “People are losing their homes. Peoples’ health is declining. The wealth gap is growing.” All these examples have inagentive language used to describe problems, but the circumstances around those problems remain unclear. For instance, people may lose their house keys, but people never “lose” their homes. So, home foreclosures required getting attributed to economic greed (2008 recession).

Establishing the “people” role of a problem from the outset is something that is mission critical. If society can be helped to understand how problems are people-made then it can be made to believe that problems can be people-fixed.

3. Sell the Brownie, Not the Recipe.

A walk down the baking isle promises to feature boxes with pictures of cakes and brownies: boxes that house ingredients on the inside and a recipe on the backside. Now, consider what people are more likely to buy first: a box with a picture of ingredients (powder, milk, eggs, etc.) or a picture of what a baked good could look like? Marketing psychology tells us that every single person is guaranteed to choose the box with a picture of a tasty-looking baked goody over ones with a picture of ingredients.

Whether a person wants to sell someone brownies or a policy solution, it is the same, nothing can be better than selling an outcome or final product. The example referenced when describing how to “sell the brownie” had to do with the U.S.’ healthcare system. A contrast between selling “universal single-player healthcare” and selling how “you can see the doctor that you need and not worry about the bill that comes later”.

Selling the feeling that people will have because of an outcome or final product was described as the master key for opening up “resistance locks”. Because our brains generally make sense of abstract ideas or complex things in terms of tangible ideas and simpler things.

4. Order Matters (Values -> Villain -> Vision)

Messages need to land for them to activate, and this is best done by opening up with a value or ideal that is shared across society. Instead of starting off by listing a “problem”, it is better to stick problems in-between the desirable things a society believes in and that can be made possible.

When it comes to crafting a message that will land with large audiences, the order he suggested works best is “values -> villain -> vision”. The way it was explained: “values” are things that would be most broadly shared, “villains” are those who created problems and violated shared “values”, and “vision” paints a picture of a world that is possible if people act together. These three steps were described as the best way to create cognitive dissonance, then resolving it with a closing idea or vision of a future that could be made possible.

5. Politics is not Solitaire

Recognizing the science behind strategic communication is essential when it comes to changing lives and reshaping the future but, more than that, rarely has anything worth remembering been achieved alone. Arguably the biggest obstacles in society were rooted in “us versus them” mentalities, despite that lines of difference were lines that people could step over or even erase altogether.

Native-born versus immigrant, insured versus un-insured, educated versus under-educated, privileged versus under-privileged—battles like these did nothing other than create enmity, disgust, and distrust between people. All of it undermined the truth that divisions have always been structural, and that broad-based prosperity is possible, and that the world was created with everyone in mind. Simply put, solidarity is important, as is being there for people who we may not always agree with—because the future will always be one that is shared.

6. If your words don’t spread, they don’t work

Hearing suggestions from those closest to us has a different effect than hearing things from people we have no connection to. That is why Miracle Whip spends 95% of every advertising dollar to advertise to their consumer base, because of the power of “word of mouth” advertising. Those advertising principles also apply to other messages, determined by the kinds of words we used.

Most people can be persuaded to toggle between conflicting ideas, switching whenever they hear a good point from either side, so it takes more than common sense to make ideas a permanent fixture. The real power lays in language that is rooted in helping people get beyond a place of “good point”, by using words that connect to the core of who we are as people. Because it is a lot easier to toggle between ideas than it is between who we are and what we stand for.

How to Make Believe

Understanding where people are—that is, what resonates with them, and what makes sense to them—is important. Meeting people where they are, with the kind of ideas that they may find appealing tends to be inadequate because where people are and the kind of ideas they find appealing can suck. Yet, the reality in all of it is that there actually is no such place where people are, all of it is rooted in human cognition, and everyone can be brought to a place of cognitive ease.

Whether a person ends up being someone who takes the temperature or someone who can change the temperature comes down to how they communicate—a superpower that every person has within them. Tapping into that superpower lets us bring people from a place of where they are to an understanding of where they can go through words and images. Seeing is believing, which means that we must never surrender the narrative for the vision of how we can change lives and reshape the future in a world that was made with everyone in mind.

COVID-19 reshaped how government functions

During testimony provided by a former Public Safety Minister, there was acknowledgement that there were issues related to the flow of classified information that did not become evident until the arrival COVID-19. Prior to COVID-19’s arrival, classified information was described as flowing rather “freely”, often delivered in binders, and any applications made by public safety stakeholders for warrant approvals or renewals had a 4-to-8-day turnaround window. Once the COVID-19 lockdowns began, the flow of classified information had all but stopped because there were no protocols to securely transport classified documents and leaving them in shared offices was not an option. Further complicating the matter was that Ministerial offices did not have direct access to Canada’s Top-Secret Network (CTSN) and that were times when the kind of security briefings that would get scheduled were different from the security briefings that took place.

During testimony offered up by a panel representing the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), there was discussion on how the flow of classified information (paper form) that was flowing into the PMO was being delivered daily and weekly pre-COVID-19. The PMO would then filter through everything and provide the Prime Minister with an update on the most important information, but the arrival of COVID-19 changed everything. It was suggested that some classified documents that public safety stakeholders had claimed had made their way to the PMO never ended up reaching the office. Then, there was mention of how one specific intelligence briefing referenced a meeting that had never occurred, yet it appeared in classified documents. Additionally, changes to how classified information flowed were detailed after the leaks to the Globe and Mail, there was the creation of a specific role (client relations officers) and there were new protocols allowing for total oversight and full accountability for all-things classified.

Other testimony provided on the matter over the 4.5 weeks included discussion around the risk assessments of “vulnerable” MPs and how the PMO would be provided with background information on individuals from both public safety and policing stakeholders. It was also discussed how the information that made its way into intelligence reports sometimes required accounting for potential biases and motivations of those compiling such reports that could impact the reliability of such information. Another point that was discussed related to the cultural reluctance across Canada’s institutions to divulge information with the necessary parties, and it was suggested that public safety and policing stakeholders were often unfamiliar with the norms and realities of different fields (political campaigning).

One of the biggest shockers came from an acknowledgment that different public safety stakeholders and political leaders have slowly begun to approach various public office holders and others with institutional powers to inform them that it was necessary for them to step away their roles. Whether that meant “retiring” or “stepping away”, they would be allowed to leave with dignity instead of public safety and policing stakeholders having to get involved (as it was not in the public interest to stain the public office). And there were indications that political parties are now being made aware when they were targets of foreign interference, and  were likely to start to receiving background information on potential candidates and their nominations processes.

News consumption has changed forever

During testimony by the Minister of Canadian Heritage, the focus was on communication and the intersections of mis/disinformation, legacy media, digital literacy, and how the digital revolution has fundamentally changed how people live. One of the points that was referenced highlighted the importance of taking an active role in preventing the death of legacy media from the arrival of big tech platforms, and how layoffs were still taking place across the legacy media landscape despite the federal government having provided support to the sector. The ability for people to receive up-to-the-second updates on breaking stories over big tech platforms managed to eliminate every advantage that legacy media had held.

At the arrival of big tech, much of the instantaneous sharing was not monetized, but legacy media was slow to adapt to the new landscape. The new landscape put pressure on being the first to “break” the story (over social media), effectively eliminating the need for people to visit legacy media websites and wiping out advertising dollars. Additionally, if copyright or sharing violations occurred over TV or radio then the CRTC could get involved, but the CRTC was powerless with big tech platforms. On the topic of Generative AI, fake or manipulated content, it was mentioned how there was legislation that was being tabled that was looking at the possibility of demonetizing “bad actors” that engaged in creating fake or manipulated content and made money from doing so.

None of the lawyers seemed interested in probing the extent of those generative AI deliberations, but I did manage to connect with a staffer from the Minister’s office. Unfortunately, although I did send questions over, I have not received a response as yet. What piqued my interest was whether any consideration had been given to the forwarding of funds earned when an online account earned money by using a person’s likeness or copyrighted footage that belonged to a media company. Instead of blocking funds, I believe accounts that earn money by using another person’s “image or likeness” (real or AI-generated) or manipulated footage from media interviews (owned by media company), should be made to provide all the money earned to the owners.

The Death of the Gold Standard of a Criminal Conviction

During testimony provided by federal policing leaders, foreign interference was described as an existing threat that had evolved to require cooperation across every level of policing and now requiring “new teams” to deal with it. The organization’s leaders described the RCMP as being responsible for educating other police forces (country-wide) and how organized criminal activities are troubling all levels of policing. Lower levels of policing (municipal and provincial) were most likely to come across serious organized criminal activities first, given they were on the “front lines”, but most of those police officers were ill-prepared to handle such complicated crimes.

Arguably the biggest shocker came with the acknowledgement that there have been occasions where crimes were  reported by victims or by their friends and family, and that police stakeholders were incapable of acting on the complaints because the reported criminal activities were related to existing high-level police investigations. As a result, criminal complaints were cast aside because acting on them would effectively ruin existing high-level police investigations involving years of undercover work to get close to targets. Additionally, it was noted that the imposing of sanctions was ineffective because of how sanctions could easily be circumvented through shell companies, among other limitations of Canada’s Criminal Code.

It was also noted that one of the biggest challenges to policing foreign interference was described as inconsistent police practices, with many police organizations described as being unlikely to meet the necessary standards for national security investigations. Other challenges related to how recent foreign interference legislation had yet to be tested in court, and it was expected there would be issues related to the thresholds required to obtain warrants to collect evidence not always meeting the legal threshold to be used in criminal prosecutions. It was suggested that policing stakeholders needed to move away from the “gold standard” that was tied with criminal prosecutions and convictions, and that police files (investigations) that get “closed” are never permanently closed and can still be worked on.

On the topic of “deterrence”, there was discussion about how there were instances where illegal activities had been identified as taking place in locations where legitimate immigration-related activities were taking place. The only problem was that legitimate organizations would request that police not loiter on the premises because their client base felt uncomfortable with the police presence. The trust gap between communities and policing stakeholders was described as a major concern for policing stakeholders at-large. Some of the steps being taken to rebuild that trust included building up relationships across various ethnic communities, with their community leaders, organizing weekly meetings, and by allowing some RCMP hires to work in their home cities.

Further context was provided regarding “sensitive sector requests”, how there were specific protocols when national security investigations entered sensitive sectors: academia, media, religion, trade unions, and politics. As it related to “duty to warn”, when there were threats to life, policing stakeholders would advise targets to avoid going out in public, providing them with advice and services on how to handle potential scenarios, but protective services were not included. And questions regarding whether policing stakeholders had been previously aware the kinds of foreign interference activity that is now at the center of the Foreign Interference Commission (and for how long), they received “no comment” responses.

Public Safety Updates Including the Premiers

During testimony by the then-Minister of Public Safety, there was an acknowledgement that it was due time for legislative changes to account for the evolving threat that was presented by foreign interference.  Arguably the biggest surprise came when the then-Minister acknowledged that they also first learned about “foreign interference” from the stories that leaked in the media about how MPs were targeted and how, prior to that, it was not on any elected official’s radar. There was even a new “first” related to cross-collaboration between federal and provincial stakeholders: Premiers would begin to receive public safety briefings because threats stemming from foreign interference were finally accepted for being the dynamic threat that targeted all of Canada’s policy makers, at every level of government.

The first exchange between federal stakeholders and a Premier involved British Columbia Premier, David Eby, who made the request to connect with public safety stakeholders at the federal level. One of the reasons why such interactions were not taken earlier had to do with legislative constraints that impaired the ability to do so, the separation of powers existing between the federal government and provincial governments. Then, it was suggested that it may be necessary to get intelligence briefings directly from analysts, because there would be questions that arose during intelligence briefings with MPs that could not be answered in real-time, and having those answers was crucial for effective decision making.

What came as a surprise was that the then-Minister of Public Safety suggested it may be necessary to consider bringing about new oversight bodies related to oversight over “all things classified”, with no constraints. Regarding the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), whether the body continues to exist remains uncertain and would depend on future governments. However, it was suggested that NSICOP’s current mandate was likely inadequate and that it was necessary to consider expanding the current mandate to better account for threats like foreign interference.

A Personal Connection

What was unique about getting accredited with the Foreign Interference Commission and covering the proceedings is that most of the high-ranking officials (current or retired) that gave testimonies were my clients while I was working in telecom (2015-2018) at a flagship location in Ottawa’s downtown. Back then, I helped them to set up their digital services and to service their accounts. During our interactions, we would chat about everything from cyber security to humanitarian work, and I hooked them all up with “beyond top secret” plans that were years ahead of what was available on the market. At the time, none of them were in their Director, Commissioner or other leadership roles, but it was interesting seeing them in a different environment and doing their jobs in high pressure judicial settings.

As the Foreign Interference Commission is set to conclude, the final report is set to be released by the end of January, perhaps the biggest takeaway from everything should be that the Globe and Mail is responsible for setting off the series of events that brought about the public inquiry and the subsequent institutional improvements. Seeing how all these improvements came about because of people breaking the law and leaking top secret information rather than government trying to actively better itself, it serves an indictment on the functionality of our democratic institutions. That indictment should be enough, I would think, to warrant a Canada-wide update of secondary school curriculums so that every civics and citizenship class includes a case study on the Foreign Interreference Commission—so that the leaders of tomorrow may one day get government right.

All of the roundtables provided key insights, including shocking acknowledgements about how it was not uncommon for policing stakeholders to decide against pursuing criminal investigations related to high-level organized crime and explaining the reason as to why intelligence collected by CSIS is not able to be used during criminal prosecutions.

Building Democratic Resilience Amid Value Conflict

Subject matter experts on this panel had backgrounds in academia, law and journalism, and they provided insight on how Canada could build resilience within its institutions amid all the problems that are plaguing our society. Despite that Canada was seen as a world leader in trustworthy election processes, the current information environment was described as having the potential to influence perceptions across Canada to believe otherwise.

On the topic of FI, FI had many core purposes that needed to be accounted for and focusing on a single form of FI would change very little. Thus, the ambiguity of FI makes establishing the traditional standard for a “legal definition”, to outline what was legal and illegal, practically impossible. As a result, it was necessary to establish a “good enough” definition for working purposes, one that could then be expanded as necessary. So, it was suggested that the focus should be on getting to a point where there was a “good enough” (imperfect) definition, and that it may even be necessary for the Commission to rework their own definition to account for the totality of the threat that FI poses.

On the topic of countering FI, what mattered was not whether a neutral institution was effective at countering it, but whether that institution was perceived as being neutral. If not, being “neutral” meant nothing, and that challenge was further complicated by the polarization present across Canada. Other challenges included how FI could shift to evade law enforcement, how evidence related to it was often not permitted to be used in courts and that political pressures and incentives had the potential to complicate responses to FI. Finally, whether someone ended up getting prosecuted for FI would ultimately come down to the discretion of law enforcement.

What seemed to catch the Commission off-guard, however, was that the panelists disputed a major claim that emerged during Stage 1 and Stage 2, “that FI was the root of all the erosion of trust in political parties and institutions”. Instead, it was suggested that the distrust was the result of deeper factors and longstanding conditions, instances over the decades where institutional power holders attempted to cover the misuse of institutional powers and serious wrongdoings for personal gain and self-preserving purposes. It was even suggested that there were too many risks to letting the government regulate speech, because of how institutional power holders could supress speech for partisan or political reasons. In summary, FI was exploiting burgeoning crisis of trust, an issue that required an understanding of “when”, “why” and “how” it began.

Diplomatic Perspectives on the Foreign Intervention ‘Gray Zone’

Subject matter experts on this panel had backgrounds in diplomacy, international affairs and national security, discussing how diplomacy has always involved a wide spectrum of actions including FI, and how FI has always been a way for nations to achieve national objectives just short of war. The length that some nations were willing to go with their FI activities was described as only being limited estimates of the potential consequences they may face. And there was consensus among the panel that some of Canada’s greatest achievements have been achieved in the “grey zone” of FI.

The panel suggested that there were benefits to FI that served liberal democratic purposes and that it was in Canada’s interest to preserve the “grey zone” of FI rather than eliminating it altogether. Another point was made how Canada has not taken positions against FI when friendly states engaged in such activities, but it has objected to the same practices when they were done by other states. Another point was made how policing and public safety stakeholders have been aware for decades about how hostile state actors have funded different organizations and that there have been legislatures across Canada where elected representatives have been identified as having collaborated with hostile states.

The panel discussed Canada’s delayed response to FI being the result of intelligence that was collected in a vacuum, and how different people would often interpret the same reports as having different meanings. One panelist suggested that intelligence reports could eventually become tools that get used for political purposes, so there were serious consequences for getting reports wrong. Another point of emphasis was that the focus of FI needed to be on municipal and provincial level activity, where were seen as far more vulnerable than the federal level.

The panel compared today’s Canada with a Canada from decades past, where political parties and institutions were trusted—something now described as having all but dissipated. Those days of our past were described as ones where people believed in laws and in the public interest, and how it was individuals and institutional scandals that resulted in the shattering of that trust. The most common consensus across Canada was described as the belief that it was necessary to distrust our institutions. It was also suggested that the Globe and Mail FI leaks had highlighted an uncomfortable truth, that FI had always been taking place in Canada, but it was something that most Canadians did not consider. Canada was too far removed from plaguing national security threats related to things like war (Europe) and immigration (U.S.).

Building Disinformation, Digital Space and Democratic Processes

Subject matter experts on this panel had backgrounds in academia, and what made this panel standout out was the academic introduction into the world of FI. After World War 2, FI boomed, with the primary form of FI conducted through the then-new form of communication—the radio. Between 1946 and 2000, 11% of all the world’s elections were interfered with by the US and Soviet Union, a percentage based on what was “known”. FI was described as an activity that was focused on controlling the flow of information or narrative, because whoever controlled a narrative was all but guaranteed to win their war.

The history of legacy media was highlighted, their role as a traditional gatekeeper of what information and stories were delivered to the masses and how they were not immune to political and institutional influence. In today’s digital world, however, it was possible to bypass that gatekept path to masses, through social networks and with people from around the world. For those with the digital “know-how”, it was possible to boost posts and reach larger audiences. And it was even possible for employees at these social media companies to act as intermediaries to manipulate results on the back end, affecting things like account visibility and search results that populate.

Another aspect that complicated FI activities conducted over social platforms is that these activities are borderless, so they are harder to regulate. Since FI is a permanent activity, it was suggested that FI should be monitored year-round. Additionally, it was suggested that those tasked with tracking FI should be required to publish related reports. It was even suggested that our institutions, created in the 19^th century, have aspects to them that do not work in 21^st century environments, which is why public trust in institutions is at an all-time low. In short, social cohesion was eroding while radicalization and polarization was amplifying.

Canada’s National Security Apparatus

Subject matter experts on this panel had leadership backgrounds in national security, detailing how outside of Ottawa, a few academics and a few journalists, the threat of FI was not acknowledged as being a significant threat to Canada, or one that was ongoing and permanent. From the get-go, a former public safety director requested that the Commission be explicit in declaring FI as a present and serious danger because it was not being treated as such. It was a threat that saw too much emphasis on public safety stakeholders and that it required more civil society involvement.

As it related to the RCMP and CSIS, “risk aversion” was described as the key reason as to why the two stakeholders rarely applied their “full powers”. Other challenges for the two related to changing mandates, and that a key priority moving forward needed to be establishing greater cooperation between federal, provincial and municipal levels of government, because of how FI starts at lower levels of government. An issue was also raised with how most laws related to national security have almost always been drafted in times of crisis, and thus were backwards looking and incapable of accounting for evolving threat landscapes.

On the supply-side of national security, providing reports and updates to different stakeholders had challenges related to how different products were “interpreted” by different stakeholders. One reason for this challenge was that products get crafted by a national security officer (and for national security officers) and without regard for other stakeholders that may require access to those products. Other aspects that legislators and academics lacked familiarity with included a lack of understanding with how products were crafted, how information and intelligence is shared between stakeholders, the limitations related to the usage of evidence for prosecutions, how containing the harms related to national security investigations has gotten harder, and how such investigations start slower and are forced to play catch up.

Unlike Canada’s closest security partners (US, UK, Australia), Canada does not have a “national security council”, and there are challenges related to continuity for international cooperation on major international files. It was not uncommon for files to transition between different Canadian security officers every few years. In contrast, partner countries had their permanent oversight bodies staffed with academics, former statesmen, retired public servants, and they have full access to all information and a right to know anything and everything related to policing and public safety.

Enforcing, Deterring and Prosecuting Foreign Interference Activities

Subject matter experts on this panel were comprised of leadership backgrounds in federal policing and criminal prosecution and academia, and the panel was critical and unrestrained in their remarks about the national security ecosystem in Canada. The panel was particularly critical of there being a new “gold standard”, reminding that Canadian policing stakeholders have previously tried to implement a similar approach many decades ago that failed miserably. The panel even suggested that the criminal justice system (as an institution) had an obligation to protect everyone on Canadian territory, and a sovereign state that was incapable of doing so was not worthy of the name. By far the most compelling roundtable.

The former federal police leader, who arguably provided the best insights into the issue of FI, started his discussion by deviating away from the Stage 1 and Stage 2 talks of a new “gold standard” in policing, detailing how aggressive criminal investigations that result in timely and successful prosecutions needed to be an essential part of Canada’s “whole of society” approach to FI. Not producing criminal convictions related to FI, combined with the language of a new “gold standard”, is something he noted would likely further dimmish trust in the institution of policing and institutions at-large. Additionally, police officers (municipal and provincial police were most likely to uncover FI), lawyers and judges in Canada were described as having little to no working knowledge on many national security and transnational issues.

Another big shocker was the acknowledgement that it was not uncommon for policing stakeholders to abandon criminal investigations if they had transnational components to them because those investigations have overwhelming administrative requirements and are too time consuming. Other issues raised included an example of how the RCMP struggles to recruit Canada’s best and brightest, because corporations (KPMG) can spend more for talent, such as forensic accountants, than the RCMP is capable of paying. There was also reference to a relationship breakdown between the RCMP and CSIS, how the RCMP was wrong about the activities of certain individuals that were being investigated and how the RCMP’s surveillance team was surveilling pointless locations, and how CSIS was aware of the investigative failings but said nothing.

What may have been the biggest shocker from the policy hearings phase related to CSIS warrants and intelligence collected in relation to those warrants, specifically that Canada’s Courts were likely to rule that it was unlawful. Despite that there were multiple testimonies provided during Stage 1 and Stage 2 about how CSIS warrants require an “extremely high standard” for them to be signed off by a Public Safety Minister, CSIS was permitted (upon the signing of a CSIS warrant) to act on unproven incoming information, and matters only required the slightest of indications of there being a threat to Canada’s national security. In lay terms, the threshold for a CSIS warrant to get approved by a Public Safety Minister did not always meet the standard set out by Canada’s Charter, so it was incapable of being used in court.

On the topic of “deterrence” as a police strategy, that approach was described as using a combination of actions to shape an adversary’s behavior in a way that met police objectives. Deterrence was described as a framework that entailed a multi-faceted approach that offered various pathways to go after a threat actor, including “punishing and denying” their wants, with policing and public safety stakeholders working together. Overall, “deterrence” was described as an easier approach to managing threats and has proven to be a successful police strategy, but it also had elements of “bluffing” to it that could completely undermine police efforts.

As it related to top office holders, they were described as always demanding to be briefed on high-level policing investigations. Such occasions were described as having resulted in many instances where information that did get shared with top office holders would result in leaks and compromised investigations, which is why it is possible that not all information is always shared with top office holders. However, it was also suggested that there have been high-level criminal investigations related to terror financing (Hezbollah) where police could have proceeded with criminal charges, but they were blocked from doing so. Finally, all of this and more was explained as the reason behind the criticism that gets levied against Canada by its closest economic and security partners who routinely call us “a safe haven for serious organized crime activities”.

The Hogue Report will be published by January 31st, 2021.

If Stage 1, Stage 2 and the Policy Hearings phase are any indication, the Hogue Report on FI will end up being must-read, and will hopefully bring this series to a satisfying conclusion.