On March 27th, 2024, stage one of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (The Commission) began. The first two days were more of an overview of the elections system and included impact statements from different ethnic Canadian leaders who were members of different diaspora communities, their experience interacting with nations of their ethnic origin, and testimonies that were made under oath by high-ranking Elections Canada officials.
The cause behind the creation of this public inquiry goes back to an incident that transpired during nomination process, one that the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) had identified as issues with the nomination process in a federal riding. Elections Canada was unable to action the warning because of limitations within their mandate. Nothing that transpired during the past elections as it related to foreign interference was unknown to CSIS and other public safety stakeholders, it was just unactionable because of limitations within legislative mandates for various departments and agencies.
An overview of the elections system.
Canada’s 338 federal electoral districts will soon grow to 343. , There are three factors that are taken into consideration when adjusting electoral districts: a) “voter equity and parity” represents the fact that population numbers should be similar across ridings, b) communities of interest should be grouped, when possible, c) geographic size of an area should be taken into consideration. It is on the basis of all three of these factors that districts are redrawn, and not by any standalone factor.
Sometimes when there is an area that has a high density of a specific ethnic community, like a European-Canadian, Asian-Canadian, Arab-Canadian, or Latin Canadian community, this will significantly impact how a district is determined. The idea behind this factor is that these communities should then be able to obtain better representation at the Federal level and will contribute to a more perfect Federation. Sometimes, however, that is what makes these districts susceptible to influence from hostile states, and that seems to have been how certain federal districts were targeted.
Impact statements from different diasporas.
The impact statements from different diasporas leaders included tales of physical intimidation and threats, the hacking of digital devices, and the denial of consular services and entry into a person’s country of ethnic origin. Some of the examples included in-person interactions where threats would be said, the tracking of a person by vehicles, the destruction of personal property like car tires, the hacking of personal phones and computers, the denial of consular services in order to obtain documents thus impacting a person’s ability to stay in Canada or ability to travel abroad, and even the harassment of family members still residing within those ethnic countries.
One common message among the panelists (beyond that the targeted harassment stemmed from their criticism of their ethnic countries) was a shared ask made by these ethnic leaders for The Commission to explore the issue of foreign interference beyond the 2018 and 2021 election, which was followed by statements about how much of the day’s activities had roots that stretched back to the 1980s and 1990s, and that it was important for The Commission to stand firm in this pursuit.
Legislative mandates dictate what Elections Canada can and can’t do.
Canada has some of the most comprehensive election laws in the world, as well as some of the lowest thresholds for maximum donation by a person in an election cycle. However, Elections Canada does not oversee the nomination contests for political parties because there are no rules around the nomination process in the Canada Elections Act (The Act) – except for the financials. When it comes to the reported issue of election interference, it is important to distinguish that the specific incident of foreign interference that is being reviewed originates from a situation within a nomination contest in a federal district and not with the general election.
The issue of regulating the nominations process has been discussed with the all the major parties, and it is an issue that none of the major parties want to see become part of The Act. The main objections stem from the amount of costs that would be incurred and because a robust change with how memberships are administered including mandating that membership be paid for with a Canadian debit or credit card would likely resolve the shortcoming.
As it relates to the idea of “foreign interference”, the Elections Canada panel explained that it was not a specific thing but rather a series of actions, events, and strategies. Different branches of government had working relationships with some social media companies while other social media companies remained elusive or unreachable. There were also specifically assigned “open-source investigations teams” that were responsible for keeping track of what was transpiring across online platforms, and different public safety stakeholders had similarly organized teams and tools to keep track of online activity.
Most of the disinformation shared online during an election tended to be unactionable, and the individuals behind the keyboard who knew what they were doing could make themselves practically unidentifiable. Another challenge for the open-source investigation teams included getting into closed access pages like private groups or communication channels.
Suggested improvements have been made to the committees that are responsible for elections within the House of Commons. Those suggestions, along with any suggestions made by the Commission after the conclusion of the public inquiry, are likely to be adopted, potentially addressing the issues that exist within the nomination process and with the overly narrow mandates across different federal departments and agencies.
The upcoming weeks of stage one will include testimonies made by the Prime Minister, different Ministers and Members of Cabinet, along with other high-ranking officials involved with public safety. Anyone interested in following the proceeding for themselves can visit the designated webpage for the Foreign Interference Commission.
